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Abstract: Striking evidence is presented of a previously un-
remarked transformation of urban structure from mainly sec-
toral to mainly functional specialisation. We offer an explanation
showing that this transformation is inextricably interrelated with
changes in ﬁrms’ organisation. A greater variety of business
services for headquarters and of sector-speciﬁc intermediates for
production plants within a city reduces costs, while congestion
increases with city size. A fall in the costs of remote management
leads to a transformation of the equilibrium urban and indus-
trial structure. Cities shift from specialising by sector — with
integrated headquarters and plants — to specialising mainly by
function — with headquarters and business services clustered in
larger cities, and plants clustered in smaller cities.
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Over the last few decades there has been a shift in the main dimension along which cities specialise,
from a specialisation by sector to a specialisation by function. Urban economists have traditionally paid
much attention to the specialisation of individual cities in a small number of sectors (see, e.g.,
Henderson, 1988). While specialisation continues to be an important feature of the urban system
of the United States, cities are increasingly distinguished by their functional specialisation (i.e., in
management and services versus production) rather than by their sectoral specialisation (i.e., in
one particular sector of activity versus another one). This transformation of urban structure has so
far been unremarked. We provide striking evidence of it in Table 1.
The left-hand side of the table shows that sectoral specialisation within manufacturing, as
measured by a Gini index, declined steadily for cities of all sizes between 1977 and 1997.1 The
average us metro area saw its Gini index of sectoral specialisation decline from .430 to .392 between
1977 and 1997.
The right-hand side of Table 1 shows that this falling sectoral specialisation has been mirrored
by an increasing functional specialisation. We have computed the ratio of executives and managers
to production workers (occupied in precision production, fabrication, or assembly) in cities of each
size class and calculated the percentage difference between this ratio and the corresponding ratio
for the entire nation. Working through the four columns in sequence, we see that in 1950 cities
were not too different in terms of their proportions of managers and production workers. And
although the largest cities already housed relatively more managers, there was no clear ranking by
city size. By 1980 differences across cities had increased substantially and a clear ranking by size
had emerged: larger cities had become specialised in management functions whereas smaller cities
had become specialised in production. This pattern became even more marked over the following
decade. In 1990, the nine largest us metro areas had 39% more managers per production worker
than the national average. For metro areas with a current population between 1.5 and 5 million,
the ﬁgure was 25.7% above the national average. At the other extreme, non-metro areas and metro
areaswithless thanaquarterofa millionpeoplehadrespectively49.5%and20.7%fewermanagers
per production worker than the national average.
In this paper we develop a formal framework that explains this urban transformation and
suggests that it is inextricably interrelated with changes in ﬁrms’ organisation. Speciﬁcally, to the
increasing separation of the management and production facilities of individual ﬁrms. This separation
is one of the most signiﬁcant trends in the internal organisation of ﬁrms of the last century
(Chandler, 1977).2 Kim (1999) carefully documents this process in his account of the rise of
multi-location ﬁrms in the United States. The percentage of us manufacturing workers employed
in multi-location ﬁrms increased from 51.4% in 1939 to 73.1% in 1987. A crucial component of
1Alternative measures of specialisation show a similar decline over time as well as a greater specialisation of smaller
cities. Kim (1995) looks at us Census Regions instead of cities over a longer time period and ﬁnds that these have
experienced a similar decline in their sectoral specialisation since the 1930s.
2Another important trend has been ﬁrms’ increasing reliance on outside suppliers. This growth in outsourcing has
received wide attention in the literature (see Perry, 1989, for a survey) and is outside the scope of this paper, in which




in management against productionc
1977 1987 1997 1950 1970 1980 1990
05,000,000−19,397,717 .377 .376 .374 +10.2% +22.1% +30.8% +39.0%
1,500,000−04,999,999 .366 .360 .362 +00.3% +11.0% +21.6% +25.7%
500,000−01,499,999 .397 .390 .382 −10.9% −07.8% −05.0% −02.1%
250,000−00,499,999 .409 .389 .376 −09.2% −09.5% −10.9% −14.2%
75,000−00,249,999 .467 .442 .410 −02.1% −07.9% −12.7% −20.7%
67−00,075,000 .693 .683 .641 −04.0% −31.7% −40.4% −49.5%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from County Business Patterns (sectoral specialisation) and Decennial
Census of Population and Housing (functional specialisation).
aThe units of analysis are Metro Areas plus those counties not included in any Metro Area. This covers the entire
continental us. For Metro Areas, county-level data has been aggregated into Metropolitan Statistical Area/Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area outside New England and into New England County Metropolitan Area in New England
using 2000 deﬁnitions. Individual Metro and Non-metro Areas have been allocated to the same population class for the
entire table on the basis of population data from the Decennial Census of 2000.
bMean value for each population class of a Gini index comparing the local and national distributions of employment
shares across 2-digit sic manufacturing sectors. If sh and sh are respectively the local and national shares of employment
in sector h, the Gini specialisation index is 1
2 ∑h |sh − sh|. Its value is close to one if a city is fully specialised in a sector
that is very small at the national level and is equal to zero if local employment is dispersed across sectors in the same
way as national employment.
cPercentage difference from the national average in the number of executives and managers per production worker
(occupied in precision production, fabrication, or assembly).
Table 1. The diminishing sectoral specialisation and increasing functional specialisation of us cities
this rise of multi-location ﬁrms has been the growing importance of separate establishments acting
as headquarters. The number of stand-alone headquarters and their employment rose by 78.9%
and 68.9% respectively between 1958 and 1987 — more than twice as fast as overall multi-location
employment in manufacturing over the same period.
The decisions made by ﬁrms regarding their organisation (such as whether to be spatially
integrated or to split management and production across multiple locations) are not made in a
void. They are affected by the environment in which ﬁrms operate. And this environment is in
turn shaped by the cumulation of ﬁrms’ organisational choices. This paper develops a simple
general equilibrium model in which ﬁrms’ organisational choices are endogenous and interrelated
and studies the links between ﬁrms’ organisation and the urban system.
Our model (set up in Section 2) considers multiple ﬁnal sectors, each made up of ﬁrms with
both headquarter and production activities. Each ﬁrm gains from integrating headquarter and
production in a single location because this saves in management costs. However, depending on
the urban structure, there may also be gains from becoming a multi-location ﬁrm with headquarter
and production establishments in different cities. This is because cities with a wider range of
business service suppliers are less costly places in which to operate a headquarter. Similarly, the
sharing of intermediate suppliers by production plants reduces productions costs in cities with
more same-sector suppliers. At the same time, larger cities are more congested places which results
2in higher living costs. Workers are mobile across cities and occupations, and the number and
composition of cities are endogenous.
We begin to solve the model by determining the types of cities that can exist in equilibrium
(Section 3). Then we derive both the equilibrium choice of organisational form by ﬁrms and the
equilibrium urban structure (Section 4). When the additional costs associated with managing
production from a remote headquarter are high, ﬁrms remain integrated. Given the beneﬁts of
sharing intermediate suppliers and urban congestion costs, cities host headquarters and produc-
tion plants but specialise by sector. However, when the additional costs associated with managing
production remotely fall below a certain level, for which we provide a closed-form solution, both
the organisation of ﬁrms and the urban structure undergo profound changes. Firms previously
organised as single units become multi-unit organisations. In choosing where to locate their now
separate establishments, ﬁrms aim to place their headquarter in cities where business service em-
ployment is abundant and their production plant in cities with a greater same-sector specialisation
in ﬁnal production. Since similar organisational and location choices are made by a large number
of ﬁrms, this in turn affects the employment patterns of cities, which is itself what makes the
organisational choice worthwhile. This leads to a shift in the main dimension along which cities
specialise, from a specialisation by sector to a specialisation by function. As a result of the beneﬁts
of sharing business service suppliers across ﬁrms and sectors, headquarters from different sectors
and business services cluster in a few large cities. Manufacturing plants, for which localisation
economies are weaker empirically as well as in the model, cannot afford to pay high enough wages
tocompensateforthehighcongestioncosts. Theymoveawayandclusterinsmallerseparatecities.
We conclude the paper with some ﬁnal remarks and suggestions for further work (Section 5).
Of the large theoretical literature dealing with the organisational and location choices of ﬁrms,
three particular streams are more closely related to our work. The theoretical literature on multina-
tional enterprises has endogenised ﬁrms’ choice of location for multiple facilities (Helpman, 1984,
and Markusen, 1984, are two early examples, while Markusen, 1995, provides a survey). However,
this line of work focuses on the location decisions of ﬁrms taking the environment in which they
operate as exogenous, whereas we are interested in determining ﬁrms’ operating environment
endogenously as a general equilibrium outcome shaped by ﬁrms’ decisions.
More recently, a series of papers (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Marin and Verdier, 2002;
Puga and Treﬂer, 2002; Antràs, 2003) have developed general equilibrium frameworks where both
ﬁrms’ organisation and the market structure in which they operate are endogenous. However,
location choices are ignored so that there is unique environment faced by all ﬁrms. Furthermore,
the organisational choices on which these papers focus concern ownership and power allocation.
This paper instead takes ﬁrm boundaries as given and asks whether ﬁrms locate their various
internal facilities in the same or in different geographical locations. Our paper thus deals with the
separation of ﬁrms’ activities in terms of geography rather than in terms of ownership.
Finally, in the urban economics literature, Davis (2001) studies the location of production relat-
ive to distribution facilities and natural resources. However, his focus is on the relative magnitude
of transport costs for ﬁnal goods and for natural resources. More closely related to this paper is the
work of Ota and Fujita (1993), who propose a model where ﬁrms make decisions about the location
3of their facilities and these decisions in turn affect the urban environment. However, their model
deals only with location within a city, and is thus more useful to understand differences between
a city’s centre and its suburbs than differences across cities in an urban system.
In terms of empirical work, the shift from sectoral to functional urban specialisation that we
report does not seem to be speciﬁc to the us. Following the working paper version of this paper,
Bade, Laaser, and Soltwedel (2003) have replicated the functional specialisation part of our Table
1 using German data for the period 1976-2002. They ﬁnd that Germany has followed the same
pattern that we ﬁnd for the us: increasing functional specialisation over time of large cities in
management activities and of smaller cities in production activities.
Consistent with the predictions of our model, there is also evidence that, together with manage-
ment functions, larger cities have also absorbed business service employment as well as headquar-
ters. According to Kolko (1999), in 1910 manufacturing accounted for about six times as much
employment as business services in all size-classes of us cities. Over time this similarity across
cities of different sizes has disappeared. There has been a growing concentration of manufacturing
in small and medium-sized cities and of business services in larger cities, to the extent that the ratio
of manufacturing to business service employment is now 4.5 times higher in non-metro areas than
in metro areas with over 2.5 million people. Regarding headquarters, Shilton and Stanley (1999)
study the location of over 5,000 headquarters in the us, and ﬁnd that 40% of them are clustered in
just 20 major urban counties. In Japan, headquarters have also become increasingly concentrated
in Tokyo and, to a lesser extent, in Osaka, while mass-production activities have been gradually
displaced outside the major metropolitan areas (Fujita and Tabuchi, 1997; Fujita and Ishii, 1998).
Morerecentempiricalstudiesﬁndpatternsinthelocationofheadquartersandbusinessservices
that match various aspects of our model. First, according to Aarland, Davis, Henderson, and Ono
(2003), headquartershaveastrongpropensitytoout-sourcebusinessservices. Forusheadquarters,
the expenditure on legal, accounting, and advertising services alone is equivalent to more than two
thirds of their wage bill. This is conﬁrmed by Ono (2003), who also shows that the propensity of
ﬁrms to rely on their headquarters to buy business services increases with the size of the market
surrounding them. Second, according to Davis and Henderson’s (2004) careful study using US
Census data, headquarter location decisions are mostly driven by the existence of a large and
diverse local supply of business services rather than by the presence of a large number of other
headquarters. Furthermore, the agglomeration forces linking headquarters and business services
are very large relative to those estimated for manufacturing. Third, Strauss-Khan and Vives (2004)
ﬁnd that headquarters have tended to change location over time along the lines implied by our
model. They show that between 1996 and 2001 headquarters have moved away from locations
with relatively few other headquarters and business service producers towards locations with a
greater presence of both, whereas headquarters already in locations with relatively many other
headquarters and business service producers have tended to remain there.
42. The model
Preferences
There are m sectors producing goods for ﬁnal consumption. Consumers have Cobb-Douglas
preferences with equal shares of expenditure allocated to each of these sectors. We use superscripts
to index sectors as well as worker occupations (described below) and subscripts to index cities.
















is the global consumer price index, and Ph denotes the price of ﬁnal goods in sector h. The latter
are freely tradeable across cities, hence their prices are common to all cities. All workers in the
economy are fully mobile across cities and occupations.
Technology
Theinput-outputstructureofeachﬁnalsectorisrepresentedschematicallyinFigure1. Final-goods
ﬁrms have two facilities: a headquarter and a production plant. Each ﬁrm can adopt one of two
organisational forms: spatially integrated or multi-location.3 Spatially integrated ﬁrms have their
headquarter and their production plant in the same city, while multi-location ﬁrms have their
headquarter and their production plant in different cities. In either case, headquarters use labour
(managers) and business services as inputs to produce headquarter services. Production plants
then combine these headquarter services with sector-speciﬁc intermediate inputs to produce ﬁnal
goods. Both business services and sector-speciﬁc intermediate inputs are produced by outside
suppliers with labour, and are non-tradeable across cities.4 However, while the same business
services are used by headquarters in all sectors, the intermediates used by production plants differ
across sectors. For instance, the headquarters of apparel and automobile ﬁrms may work with
the same banks, lawyers and advertising agencies. But the car parts purchased by automobile
factories, while perhaps also used by other automobile producers, are very different inputs from
the fabrics purchased by apparel factories.
3Note that throughout this paper integration is deﬁned by the range of activities performed in the same location by
individual ﬁrms (spatial integration) and not by the range of activities performed inside as opposed to outside the ﬁrm
(organisational integration).
4Business services and sector-speciﬁc intermediate inputs are assumed non-tradeable for analytical tractability, but
the qualitative conclusions of the model would be unaffected if they were instead tradeable subject to iceberg costs
(this issue is further discussed in Section 4). Empirically, the proximity between business service suppliers and the
headquarters of their customers appears to be very important. Kolko (1999) documents the increasing concentration of
business services in the largest cities, which also attract a disproportionate share of headquarters (Shilton and Stanley,
1999). Davis and Henderson (2004) show that the presence of a wider variety of business service has a very strong effect
















Figure 1. Input-output structure of each sector
To formalise this input-output structure and to be able to speak meaningfully about sectoral as
well as functional specialisation, it is convenient to deﬁne 2m + 1 occupations for workers. We
assign index 0 to workers employed in business services, and by extension to ﬁrms in the business
service sector; index h to workers directly employed by headquarters in sector h for h = 1,...,m
and to variables related to ﬁnal production in that sector; and index m + h to workers employed
in the production of intermediate inputs speciﬁc to ﬁnal sector h for h = 1,...,m, as well as to ﬁrms
producing those intermediates.
Using this notation, we can now specify the details of ﬁrms’ technology. Final-goods ﬁrms are
perfectly competitive and have Cobb-Douglas technology, with cost shares η for the headquarter
and 1 − η for the production plant. Thus, a sector h ﬁrm with its headquarter in city i and its


















is the unit production cost, Hh
i,j is the headquarter sub-cost, and Qm+h
j is the production plant
sub-cost.
Headquarter sub-costs are in turn split in a Cobb-Douglas fashion between labour directly
employed by the headquarter and business services purchased from external suppliers, with
sub-shares µ and 1 − µ respectively. There is an endogenously determined mass s0
i of business
service varieties produced in city i. All varieties enter into headquarters’ technology with constant
elasticity of substitution θ+1
θ , where θ > 0. Thus, for an integrated ﬁrm with its headquarter and


























is the relevant price index of business services in city i, q0
i (k) is the price of variety k of business
services produced in city i.
Each ﬁrm needs to transmit headquarter services (such as organisational decisions, marketing,
or ﬁnance) to its production plant. The transmission of a ﬁrm’s headquarter services to a produc-
tionplantlocatedinadifferentcityinvolvesicebergcosts(forinstance, afractionofmanagers’time
is lost in travelling to visit the plant). Consequently, for a multi-location ﬁrm with its headquarter
in city i and its production plant in another city j the headquarter input requirements are higher




This is meant to capture that, as Kim (1999) shows using us Census data, headquarter costs
are signiﬁcantly higher for a multi-location ﬁrm than for a similarly-sized ﬁrm with integrated
headquarter and production.
Production plants for ﬁnal goods use sector-speciﬁc intermediate inputs. There is an endogen-
ously determined mass sm+h
i of intermediate inputs speciﬁc to sector h produced in city i. All
intermediate inputs speciﬁc to sector h enter into plants’ technology with constant elasticity of
substitution e+1
e , where e > 0. Thus, the relevant price index of intermediate inputs speciﬁc to














i (k) is the price of intermediate input k speciﬁc to sector h in city i.
Bothbusinessservicesandsector-speciﬁcintermediateinputsareproducedbymonopolistically
competitive ﬁrms à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The cost function of a business service ﬁrm










i (k) denotes the ﬁrm’s output. The expression in brackets is the unit labour requirement,
which has both a ﬁxed and a variable component. Thus, there are increasing returns to scale in the
production of each variety of business services. Similarly, the cost function of an intermediate ﬁrm









Note that the beneﬁts of sharing differentiated intermediate input suppliers will encourage
agglomerations of production plants just like the beneﬁts of sharing business service suppliers
will encourage agglomerations of headquarters. Alternative microeconomic foundations for these
agglomeration forces are possible (Duranton and Puga, 2004). In particular, we could model the
agglomeration of headquarter as the result of their workers becoming more productive through
7closer interactions with other headquarter workers, as in Ota and Fujita (1993). This would how-
ever lead to similar results. Specifying the same micro-foundations for agglomeration economies
in business services/headquarters as in intermediates/production plants eases the exposition and
thesharingofsuppliershastheadvantagethatitisaparticularlytractablesourceofagglomeration.
More importantly, recent empirical evidence suggests that the presence of a large and diverse
local supply of business services is the strongest determinant of the agglomeration of headquarters
(Davis and Henderson, 2004).
Internal urban structure
We model the internal spatial structure of cities in the simplest standard fashion. Production in
each city takes place at a central point, deﬁned as the Central Business District (cbd). Surrounding
this, there is a line with residences of unit length. Residents commute from their residence to
the cbd and back, losing in the process a fraction of their unit labour supply equal to 2τ times
the distanced travelled. Each consumer chooses her place of residence so as to maximise utility,
given her occupation and income, and the bid-rent curve in the city. Because of ﬁxed lot size, this
is equivalent to choosing residence so as to maximise net income. Thus, a consumer working in
occupation h in city i maximises wh
i (1 − 2τz) − Ri(z) with respect to z, where z is the distance to
the cbd and Ri(z) is the differential land rent in city i for a residence located at distance z from the
cbd.
The possibility of arbitrage across residential locations both within and across occupations
ensures that at the residential equilibrium the sum of commuting cost and land rent expenditures
is the same for all residents with the same wage; that workers sort themselves according to their
wage, with higher-paid workers (who have a higher opportunity cost of commuting time) living
closer to the cbd; that the city is symmetric and the city edges are at a distance Li/2 of the cbd
(where Li is total population in city i); and that land rent function (i.e., the upper envelope of all
bid-rent functions) is continuous, convex, and piece-wise linear. Land rent at the city edges is





Let us denote net labour available at the cbd of city i in occupation h by lh
i . This is equal
to Lh






i = Li(1− τLi). (12)
The cost of headquarters and production plants
Before we proceed to describe the mechanism for city creation, let us derive in two Lemmas
simpliﬁed expressions for the cost of production plants and headquarters in ﬁnal-goods sectors.





























xj,i dj , (13)
where we have dropped index k since all variables take identical values for all intermediate
suppliers in the same sector and city. It follows from (13) that the elasticity of demand for each
intermediate with respect to a ﬁrm’s own price is −e+1
e , so that the proﬁt-maximising price for
each intermediate is a ﬁxed relative markup over marginal cost:
qm+h
i = (e + 1) β wm+h
i . (14)
Free entry and exit in intermediates drives maximised proﬁts to zero. From the zero proﬁt condi-






Demand for labour by intermediate producers can be obtained by application of Shephard’s



















where (15) has been substituted in to yield the ﬁnal expression. By choice of units of intermediate
output, we can set β = ( e
α)
e(e + 1)


















competitive intermediate sector that hires workers and sells non-tradeable intermediates to ﬁnal-
goods producers. A larger workforce employed in any given intermediate sector m + h of a city
leads to a wider range of intermediates being produced for use in ﬁnal-good sector h. Since these
intermediates enter the production function of ﬁnal-good producers in sector h with the same
constant elasticity of substitution e+1
e , a wider range of available intermediates results in lower
production costs in this ﬁnal-good sector. Hence, despite constant returns to scale at the ﬁrm level
in ﬁnal production, there are aggregate increasing returns at the sector-city level, also known as
localisation economies. The strength of these increases with e.




















The proof of this Lemma mirrors closely that of Lemma 1 and is thus relegated to Appendix
A. The sharing of business services by headquarters, like the the sharing of intermediate suppliers
by plants, gives rise to localisation economies, whereby a larger workforce employed in a city’s
business service sector leads to a wider range of business services being produced, which in turn
results in lower costs of operating headquarters. Since business services account for a fraction
1−µ of headquarter costs, these localisation economies increase with θ(1−µ). Furthermore, since
by (7) multi-location ﬁrms face the same price index for business services as integrated ﬁrms, these
localisation economies apply under either organisational form. Note that, since business service
suppliers are shared by ﬁrms in different sectors, an increase in business service employment
in a city reduces costs for local headquarters from all sectors. An increase in employment by
intermediate suppliers, on the other hand, only reduces costs for local production plants in the
sector using those intermediates.
City formation
To complete the model, we need to specify a mechanism for city formation. The simplest altern-
ative is to consider perfectly competitive land development companies or land developers. At the
same time, active municipal governments with tax raising powers can play an equivalent role that
would lead to identical results.5 In fact, all we require to obtain our results is some mechanism that
prevents urban conﬁgurations that are sustainable only under a coordination failure from arising
in equilibrium — for instance, situations in which no-one moves away from inefﬁciently large
cities for fear of no-one else following.
Forsimplicity, wealsowanttoavoidlumpinessproblems, suchassectorsbeingsmallerthanthe
smallest city. We thus assume a large economy in which there is a continuum of land developers,
not all of which will be active in equilibrium (since there is a discrete number of equal-sized
industries, the assumption of a continuum of cities guarantees that no industry will be smaller
than the smallest city in equilibrium). Each developer controls all land in several potential sites for
a city. Land developers can give occupation-speciﬁc subsidies to workers. Let us denote by Th
i the
subsidy given by the developer in city i to workers with occupation h. Before workers choose their
occupation and sector, land developers announce the sites at which they wish to develop cities,
5See Fujita (1989) and Henderson and Becker (2000) for discussions of this issue and for an equivalence result
between these two types of institutions. Henderson and Mitra (1996) discuss the practical relevance of large agents
in city formation.
10the aggregate population and the distribution across occupations that they wish to attain.6 There
is free entry and perfect competition amongst land developers. When active, each land developer













subject to workers in each active occupation in the city obtaining the highest consumption income




i ¯ e , Lh
i > 0 , (19)
and subject also to ﬁrms with only their headquarter, only their production plant, or both facilities,






































































6 0 , xh





i,j dj aggregates the output of multi-location ﬁrms across all cities, and
Qm+h denotes the lowest sub-cost for a ﬁnal-sector stand-alone plant elsewhere and ρHh denotes
the lowest sub-cost for a ﬁnal-sector stand-alone headquarter elsewhere. Note that the worker
participation constraint of (19) is binding because of free worker mobility, which ensures that in
equilibrium workers collect the same net returns everywhere. Similarly, the ﬁrm participation
constraints of (20)–(22) are also binding.
Consumers are Arrow-Debreu shareholders in all ﬁrms and in all land development companies.
However, free entry by ﬁrms and land developers drives their proﬁts to zero in equilibrium.
Thus, the equilibrium consumption expenditure of a worker with occupation h in city i living at a
distance z fromthecbdisthesumofwageincomeandanytransfers, minuslandrentexpenditures:
eh
i (z) = wh
i (1− 2τz) + Th
i − Ri(z) . (23)
6Thereasonwhydevelopersneedtoannouncepopulationtargetsaswellassubsidylevelsisthatotherwisetoomany
workers might gather in too few cities relative to what developers aimed to achieve. This is because of a well-know
co-ordination problem associated with city formation (Henderson, 1974; see also Henderson and Becker, 2000, for a
careful discussion of this issue and a more detailed characterisation of the land developers’ problem). Note also that
there is a one-to-one mapping between the number of workers in each occupation in the city and its ﬁrm composition.
Hence, unlike in some models where individual ﬁrms use multiple primary factors (e.g. Henderson and Becker, 2000),
transfers to workers are an adequate instrument for developers to manipulate the production externality created by
intermediate and business service suppliers to their advantage. Note that subsidies targeted at particular sectors or
particular activities (e.g., headquarters, production facilities or research centres) are very common in practice. See
Helsley and Strange (1997) and Henderson and Becker (2000) for discussions of the instruments of control and the
extent of ownership of land developers.
11To solve the model, it is useful to note that the developer’s programme is equivalent to a
situation in which the developer maximises the gap between the pre-transfer consumption ex-
penditure of workers in the city and the post-transfer income which they could obtain elsewhere,
subject to zero proﬁt by ﬁrms and a feasibility constraint.










i − Li¯ e ,
subject to (20)–(22), lh
i > 0 and (12).

























i ¯ e. Inserting this into the original programme (18) yields the result.
By lowering transfers down to the point where every worker gets ¯ e, a developer can extract
any surplus consumption income of workers in its city over that available elsewhere. Hence it is
in the developer’s interest to achieve an urban conﬁguration such that workers obtain the highest
possible pre-transfer consumption income, thus maximising the total wage bill in the city, and
simply set transfers to extract the surplus.7
3. Equilibrium types and sizes of cities
Inthis sectionweshow thatinequilibriumthere canbeat mostthreetypes ofcities: citieswithonly
stand-alone headquarters and their business service suppliers, cities with only stand-alone pro-
duction plants in one sector and their intermediate suppliers, and cities with only integrated ﬁrms
in one sector and their business service and intermediate suppliers. This is done in three steps.
First, we show that in equilibrium no city has both stand-alone headquarters and stand-alone
plants belonging to multi-location ﬁrms (Lemma 4). This still leaves the possibility of cities with
a combination of headquarters from multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms or a combination of
production plants from multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms operating in any combination of
sectors. Our second step is therefore to show that in equilibrium no city hosts production plants
in more than one sector (Lemma 5). That narrows down cities to ﬁve possible types: (i) cities with
only integrated ﬁrms in one sector, (ii) cities with only headquarters from multi-location ﬁrms,
(iii) cities with only production plants from multi-location plants in one sector, (iv) cities with
production plants of both multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms in one sector, and (v) cities
with both headquarters of multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms. Our third step is to rule out
the last two types of cities, by showing that a city with integrated ﬁrms has neither headquarters
nor production plants belonging to multi-location ﬁrms (Lemma 6). We then proceed in the
7Note also that the second-order conditions of this equivalent developer’s programme ensure that, in equilibrium,
population constraints do not need to be enforced by the developer (i.e., a small change in the mass of workers with a
given occupation will result in a reduction in their utility).
12following section to study which of the three remaining possible types of cities exist in equilibrium
depending on parameters.
Lemma 4 (Multi-location headquarter and plant separation) In equilibrium, stand-alone headquarters
and stand-alone plants belonging to multi-location ﬁrms do not coexist in the same city.
Proof Consider a city with stand-alone headquarters and production plants in the same sec-
tor. Then, from (20) and (21), Hh
i = Hh and Qm+h




















Ph > 0, which contradicts (22). Consider now a city with stand-
alone production plants in sector h and stand-alone headquarters in a different sector h0. By
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, a developer can transfer headquarter resources from sector h0 to sector h
without affecting localisation economies in the production of either business services or sector-
speciﬁc intermediates, nor its own proﬁts. This will create the same proﬁt opportunity from ﬁrm
integration, which the developer can appropriate by lowering transfers.
This lemma rules out the existence of cities hosting stand-alone headquarters and stand-alone
production plants from different multi-location ﬁrms. Its intuition is the following. The headquar-
ters of multi-location ﬁrms only locate in a city if it provides the lowest headquarter cost available
anywhere. Similarly, the production plants of multi-location ﬁrms only locate in a city if it provides
the corresponding intermediates at the lowest cost. If a city were to provide both the lowest
headquarter cost and the lowest costs for production plants for multi-location ﬁrms in the same
sector and they broke even, then multi-location ﬁrms with either a headquarter or a production
plant in the city would make positive proﬁts by becoming integrated ﬁrms — thus saving on the
transmission cost for headquarter services. The local developer could then capture the rents from
this unexploited proﬁt opportunity by lowering transfers, thus forcing ﬁrms to pay higher wages
so that worker income stays at ¯ e. Therefore, in equilibrium, headquarters and plants belonging
to multi-location ﬁrms in the same sector do not coexist in the same city. Since resources used
by headquarters, either directly or indirectly, can be shifted across sectors without changing any
wages, headquarters and plants belonging to multi-location ﬁrms do not coexist in the same city
even for different sectors. In effect, multi-location ﬁrms exist to exploit the advantages of different
types of cities for headquarters and production plants, so the headquarters and production plants
of multi-location ﬁrms are always located in different cities.
Following Lemma 4, it is still possible to envision cities with a combination of headquar-
ters from multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms or a combination of production plants from
multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms operating in any combination of sectors. As a further
restriction of the equilibrium set, the next Lemma shows that cities must be specialised in their
ﬁnal production.
Lemma 5 (Production specialisation) In equilibrium, each city hosts production plants in at most one
sector.
Proof Consider a developer choosing how to allocate across sectors the local amount of labour en-





13to (20)–(22) and keeping ∑
m
h=1 lm+h








allocation of labour across occupations m to 2m in any city does not change any price, Ph, nor any
headquarter cost, Hh
i . Consequently, by (20)–(22), it does not affect the Qm+h
i consistent with zero
proﬁts. Hence, in choosing how to allocate across sectors the local amount of labour engaged in





















i . The convexity of this expression implies that all labour producing
intermediates in any given city is allocated to a single sector.
This result is reminiscent of Henderson (1974). Recall that, because of its ability to extract any
surplus consumption income of workers in its city, each developer behaves as if maximising the
total wage bill in the city. With no equilibrium ﬁrm proﬁts this implies maximising the value of
production in the city. In the presence of localisation economies, ﬁnal output in any given city and
sector rises more than proportionately with employment in that city and sector. Maximisation of
the value of production thus implies a corner solution for the allocation across sectors of labour
employed in intermediate production. Consequently, any city that hosts plants hosts them in only
one sector.8
From Lemmas 4 and 5, only ﬁve types of cities are possible: (i) cities with only integrated
ﬁrms in one sector, (ii) cities with only headquarters from multi-location ﬁrms, (iii) cities with only
production plants from multi-location plants in one sector, (iv) cities with both production plants
of multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms, and (v) cities with both headquarters of multi-location
ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms. The next Lemma rules out the last two types of cities and shows that
cities must be specialised by organisational form.
Lemma 6 (Specialisation by type of ﬁrms) In equilibrium, each city hosts either only ﬁnal-sector
headquarters and business service suppliers, only ﬁnal-sector manufacturing plants and intermediate sup-
pliers, or only integrated ﬁrms plus business services and intermediate suppliers.









































tion of this expression we can see that proﬁt maximisation by land developers requires Hh
i = Hi
for all h such that lh
































8In practice, while many cities are narrowly specialised, some are quite diversiﬁed. However, this has much to do
with the relative advantages of diversity and specialisation for innovation and production, an issue which is outside the
scope of this paper (see Duranton and Puga, 2001).






















− Li¯ e , (27)
subject to (20)–(22), lh
i > 0 and (12).
To prove the Lemma, it is sufﬁcient to show that cities with both production plants
of multi-location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms, and cities with both headquarters of multi-
location ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms incompatible with proﬁt maximisation by the de-




















1−η = Qm+h. Similarly, in a city with both integrated ﬁrms and


















η = Hh and Qm+h
i = ρ
η
1−η Qm+h. In either case, Hi and Qm+h
i are pinned
down by the ﬁrm participation constraints, and hence they are taken as given by the developer
when implementing the programme of (27). By inspection of (27), given that θ > 0 and e > 0,
a conﬁguration with both integrated ﬁrms and production plants of multi-location ﬁrms in the
same city cannot be an equilibrium, since the developer would do better either by having only
production plants or by having no production plants except those needed to have integrated ﬁrms.
Similarly, a conﬁguration with both integrated ﬁrms and headquarters of multi-location ﬁrms in
the same city cannot be an equilibrium, since the developer would do better either by having only
headquarters or by having no headquarters except those needed to have integrated ﬁrms.
Localisation economies in the production of both business services and sector-speciﬁc interme-
diates imply that a proﬁt-maximising developer will avoid mixing headquarters and production
plants in a city, except possibly if these belong to integrated ﬁrms — due to the lower headquarter
requirements associated with integrated ﬁrms. Having reduced the possible city types to three, we
can now derive the equilibrium size of the different types of cities. Let us denote by subscripts M,
H, and I, variables corresponding to cities hosting only production plants for multi-location ﬁrms,
only headquarters for multi-location ﬁrms, and only integrated ﬁrms, respectively.
Lemma 7 (Equilibrium city sizes) In equilibrium, cities hosting only ﬁnal-sector production plants and
















where σ ≡ θ(1− µ), and γ ≡ ηθ(1− µ) + (1− η)e.
15The proof of this Lemma is relegated to Appendix B. As is standard in the literature, there
is a tradeoff between commuting costs (τ) and the extent of aggregate increasing returns in the
city (e, σ, or γ). Here, aggregate increasing returns arise despite constant-returns technology in
ﬁnal production due to the sharing of intermediate suppliers in cities with production plants of
multi-location ﬁrms, due to the sharing of business service suppliers in cities with headquarters
of multi-location ﬁrms, and due to the sharing of both types of suppliers in cities with integrated
ﬁrms. The ability of competitive developers to control the composition of the workforce in their
cityandtoextractanysurplusmakesthemefﬁcient. Atthecompetitiveequilibrium, citieswillthus
be of optimal size conditional on their type.9 This size increases with the intensity of increasing
returns and decreases with the cost of commuting. To achieve optimal city size, developers must
make transfers to local workers so as to cover the gap between the value of their private and social
marginal products. With zero proﬁts for developers, total land rents equal total transfers, and
thus are just enough to cover that gap. This is known as the Henry George Theorem and is a
standard result in urban economics, both in the context of production subject to local aggregate
increasing returns (Serck-Hanssen, 1969; Starrett, 1974; Vickrey, 1977) and in the context of local
publicgoods(Flatters, Henderson, andMieszkowski,1974;Stiglitz,1977;ArnottandStiglitz,1979).
In the current context it implies that, in equilibrium, all cities achieve optimal size, and developers
transfer all land rents in their city to local workers, ﬁlling the gap between the private and the
public marginal product of labour.
4. From sectoral to functional urban specialisation
It is now possible to derive our main result. The choice of organisational form by ﬁrms as well as
the urban structure depend on how much higher is the cost of providing headquarter services to a
plant in a different city as compared to a plant in the same city (ρ).








then all ﬁrms adopt an integrated organisational form, and all cities specialise by sector, hosting headquarters
and production plants plus business service and intermediate suppliers. If instead ρ < ˆ ρ then all ﬁrms adopt
a multi-location organisational form, and all cities specialise by function, with a share
η(1+2σ)e
η(1+2σ)e+(1−η)(1+2e)σ
of cities hosting headquarters from any sector plus business service suppliers, and the remaining cities
9It is only because the economy is large that cities can reach their optimal size regardless of the urban conﬁguration
(i.e., the number of cities of each type) . Having instead a small economy creates a lumpiness problem whereby cities
in equilibrium are typically larger than their optimal size (since any size below optimum city size is unstable) and the
relative inefﬁciency of equilibrium city sizes depends on the conﬁguration. Thus, in a small economy the main result
derived in Section 4 below would not depend on the comparison of the optimal city sizes but on the comparison of
the optimal sizes subject to the lumpiness constraint (which converge to the the optimal sizes as the economy grows
arbitrarily large). In the more pathological case of very small sectors consuming a large share of business services,
Lemma 5 may not even hold as some cities may ﬁnd it worthwhile to host production plants of integrated ﬁrms in
two or more sectors so that they can share the costs of business services. For further discussion of these issues, see
Papageorgiou and Pines (2000).
16hosting production plants plus intermediate suppliers from the same sector, with equal proportions of cities
specialised in production in each of the m sectors.



























































The ﬁrm participation constraints of (20)–(22) imply that to be sustainable cities must offer ﬁrms
the possibility of producing at the lowest available unit cost. If ρ > ˆ ρ then ch
M > ch
I, all ﬁrms adopt
an integrated organisational form, and every city hosts headquarters and production plants, which
by Lemma 5 belong to the same sector, plus their business service and intermediate suppliers. If
instead ρ < ˆ ρ then ch
M < ch
I, all ﬁrms adopt a multi-location organisational form, and every city
either hosts headquarters from any sector plus their business service suppliers or hosts produc-












= 1+ θ . (31)
The developer’s programme of Lemma 3, together with the exhaustion of developers’ proﬁts due










H = LH¯ e , wm+h
M lm+h
M = LM¯ e . (32)


























Substituting (b1), (b5), (b17), (b19), (33), and Lemma 7, into (30), and simplifying yields the value of
ˆ ρ given in the Proposition. Denote by NH the mass of cities that host headquarters of multi-location










1−η . Combining this with (32) yields the share of cities
that host only headquarters when ρ < ˆ ρ as
η(1+2σ)e
η(1+2σ)e+(1−η)(1+2e)σ. The remaining cities specialise
in production and, by symmetry, there are equal proportions of cities specialised in each of the m
sectors.
17Discussion
In our model, ﬁrms face a trade-off between the gains from integrating their headquarter and
production plant and the gains from separating them. The gains from integration stem from
lower headquarter requirements. The gains from separation arise from the lower costs of operating
headquarters in cities with a higher specialisation in business services, and the lower costs of op-
erating production plants in cities with a higher specialisation in the corresponding intermediates.
When the transmission cost for headquarter services is high, ﬁrms remain integrated. Because
of localisation economies in production and urban congestions costs increasing with size, this in
turn leads cities to specialise by sector. In contrast, when the transmission cost for headquarter
services is low, ﬁrms wish to locate their headquarter in cities where business service employment
is abundant and their production plant in cities with a greater same-sector specialisation in ﬁnal
production. And it is in the interest of proﬁt-maximising developers to make it feasible for ﬁrms
to implement this separation. Since the same organisational choice is made by a large number
of ﬁrms, it in turn affects the employment patterns of cities, which is itself what makes the
organisational choice worthwhile. As a result, some cities specialise in headquarters and business
services and others in ﬁnal and intermediate production, the latter also being specialised by sector.
Many business and economic historians have argued that the extra costs of coordinating and
monitoring multi-location ﬁrms relative to integrated ﬁrms has decreased very signiﬁcantly fol-
lowing key technological developments in transport and communication technologies, as well as
new management practices (Chandler, 1977; Kim, 1999). The cost of transporting goods, people,
and ideas has declined dramatically over the last century. For instance, maritime freight in 1990
was only one third as costly as in 1920, while for air-travel the revenue per passenger-mile in
1990 was one sixth of what it was in 1930. Large as they may seem, these changes are dwarfed
by the free fall in telecommunication costs: the cost of a three-minute telephone conversation
between New York and London fell by 98.7% between 1930 and 1990 (Jones, 1997). According
to Yates (1989; 1991), managerial and accounting innovations have played an even greater role
than the sheer reduction in the cost of physical distance. Of particular importance has been the
developmentofduplicatorsofvarioustypes, suchasthetypewritertogetherwiththeuseofcarbon
copies, and later the photocopying and fax machines, and e-mail. Such duplicators have made the
transmission of information along a managerial hierarchy and across space much faster and much
cheaper. Other recent developments in information technologies, such as online stock monitoring
and ordering have also facilitated management over large distances. On the whole, it seems that
this reduction in the cost of coordination and monitoring across distant locations can to a very
large extent be taken as exogenous to the rise of multi-location ﬁrms.
This reduction in the additional costs related to remote management can be simply represented
in the model as a reduction in ρ. Figure 2 plots the unit production cost of multi-location ﬁrms (cM)









Figure 2. Unit costs of multi-location relative to integrated ﬁrms
relative to the unit production cost of integrated ﬁrms (cI) as a function of ρ.10 When ρ is above
ˆ ρ any developers attempting to set up cities with either only headquarters or only production
plants cannot attract ﬁrms in the face of the competition from developers in cities hosting only
integrated ﬁrms, which offer lower unit production costs. Thus every ﬁrm adopts an integrated
organisational structure and every city hosts headquarters and production plants from one sector.
By Proposition 1, when ρ falls below ˆ ρ cities with either only headquarters or only production
plants of multi-location ﬁrms offer a combined unit cost below that available in integrated cities.
Firms previously organised as a single unit become multi-unit organisations. Multi-unit ﬁrms loc-
atetheirheadquartersseparatelyfromtheirownproductionplants, butclosetootherheadquarters
and business service ﬁrms. They also locate their plants close to other manufacturing facilities
with which they can share intermediate suppliers. This leads to a change in urban structure, with
a shift in the main dimension along which cities specialise, from a specialisation by sector to a
specialisation by function.11
In practice, localisation economies are likely to be stronger for business services than for man-
ufacturing intermediates (see Markusen, 1989, for a conceptual discussion of this issue and Dekle
10The ﬁgure plots (29) for ˆ ρ given by Proposition 1 with parameters σ =0.07 (a 1% increase in employment in
a city hosting headquarters and business services increases local productivity by 1.07%), e =0.05 (a 1% increase in
employment in a city hosting only production plants and intermediate suppliers increases local productivity by 1.05%),
and η =0.2 (headquarters account for 20% of total costs). By symmetry, superscript h has been dropped from ch
M and
ch
I. Note that, by (b9) and (28), cM varies with ρ but cI does not. With these parameter values, the change in ﬁrms’
organisation and in urban structure takes place when the additional costs of remote management fall below 17.3% of
the management costs for an integrated ﬁrm (ˆ ρ =1.173).
11While the model predicts recent changes in ﬁrms’ organisation and in the urban structure, it presents these as
happening suddenly as ρ falls below a certain threshold. The catastrophic aspect of these changes is due to the stylised
nature of the model. A smoother transition could be obtained with a sector-speciﬁc cost of separating headquarters
and production plant, ρh. Assume a gradual decline in this cost across all sectors with ρ1 < ρ2 < ... < ρm at all
times. Then as ρ1 falls below ˆ ρ, cities previously specialised in sector 1 undergo a shift from sectoral to functional
specialisation. Some cities are left with only production plants in this sector, whereas their headquarters concentrate in
business centres. The same happens again in sector 2,...,m as ρ2,...,ρm fall below ˆ ρ. Another extension that would
also yield a smoother transition is discussed in the concluding section.
19and Eaton, 1999, and Davis and Henderson, 2004, for empirical evidence). In terms of the model,
this simply requires that σ > e. In this case, it follows from Lemma 7 and Proposition 1 that when
cities specialise by function, headquarters and business services becomes concentrated in larger
cities and manufacturing production gets located in smaller cities (with σ > e, LH > LI > LM).12
All of this provides a consistent explanation for the stylised facts documented in the introduction.
While improvements in physical transportation technologies have facilitated the dispersion
of manufacturing activities, improvements in telecommunication technologies may have the op-
posite effect on business services and other knowledge-intensive activities (Leamer and Storper,
2001). Because of the complementarity between telecommunication and face-to-face contact (as
evidenced for instance by Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998), cheaper and more sophisticated telecom-
munications increase the beneﬁts of clustering in activities characterised by complex and timely
interactions such as business services. In our framework, this implies a growing difference in the
strength of localisation economies between business services (σ) and manufacturing intermediates
(e).13 A change in just one of these two parameters would change average localisation economies,
which would have consequences of its own. Thus, in order to isolate formally the effects of
a growing difference in the strength of localisation economies between business services and
manufacturing intermediates, consider an increase in localisation economies in business services
(σ) and a corresponding reduction in localisation economies in manufacturing (e) so as to keep
average localisation economies (γ ≡ ησ + (1 − η)e) constant. In the absence of changes in the
urban structure, such changes in localisation economies imply smaller manufacturing cities and a
growth in the size of cities hosting headquarters and business services. However, theses changes
in localisation economies may also trigger further changes in the organisation of production within
ﬁrms and across cities. Regarding the threshold for the separation of headquarters and production














ˆ ρ ≷ 0 . (34)
There is a negative effect on ˆ ρ working through relative city sizes: if σ  e, LH  LM, so
lumping production with headquarters and business services saves headquarter resources without
much added congestion. On the other hands, there is a positive effect on ˆ ρ working through
relative wages: if σ  e, wH  wM, so lumping production with headquarters and business
services involves paying production workers much more than they would earn in separate cities.
If business services generate much stronger localisation economies than manufacturing interme-
diates this second effect tends to dominate: urban concentrations of headquarters and business
services tend to be very large, and the high wages that workers must be paid to compensate for
12If we were to introduce the possibility of supplying business services and manufacturing intermediates to ﬁrms in a
different city subject to some trade cost, then a greater difﬁculty in supplying business services at a distance would also
result in higher localisation economies for business services than for manufacturing intermediates. Similarly, a greater
impact of the congestion costs associated with larger cities on manufacturing than on business services, say because of
their different land intensity, would have analogous implications for the relative magnitude of localisation economies.
13An increase in the share of headquarter costs accounted for by business services purchased from external suppliers,
1− µ, as compared to directly employed labour would have the same effect (recall that σ ≡ (1− µ)θ).
20high congestion costs drive away production plants and their suppliers, for which localisation
economies are weaker.14
5. Concluding comments
Our model relates key stylised facts regarding changes in the organisation of ﬁrms and changes
in the urban structure. Technological progress in transport and telecommunication technologies
have made it less costly for ﬁrms to separate their production facilities from their headquarter
and management facilities. Such a separation is worthwhile only if the ﬁrms can locate their
production facilities in environments with greater same sector specialisation and their headquar-
ters in business centres where business service employment is abundant. This in turn gives a
strong incentive for cities to shift from a main specialisation along a sectoral dimension to a main
specialisation along a functional dimension, leading to the emergence of separate business centres
and manufacturing cities. With greater beneﬁts from proximity for headquarters and business
services than for manufacturing, the shift from sectoral to functional specialisation also implies
that business centres are few and large whereas manufacturing centres are more numerous and
smaller in size.
Although outside the scope of this paper, three extensions of this model are worth considering.
First, one could enrich the model by assuming different types of business services. Some business
services (e.g., standard business banking or equipment leasing services) need to be provided on
a frequent basis and beneﬁt from a proximity between suppliers and customers. There are also
sophisticated business services (e.g., specialised ﬁnancial advice for mergers-and-acquisitions)
that are not required as often and for which a proximity between similar business service ﬁrms
is more important. Finally, there are routinised business services (e.g., call centres) that can be
easily be provided from far-away. In this case, when business services and manufacturing become
separated, we would expect day-to-day services to locate in relatively large cities close to the
headquarters of their customers, more sophisticated services might cluster in a handful of ’world
cities’ (such as New York, London, and Tokyo) concentrating all the highest management functions
(Hall, 1984), and the likes of call centres might be farmed-out to low-cost locations.
Second, one could incorporate a richer geography. For instance, the cost of managing produc-
tion remotely might increase in the distance from the headquarter. This could explain the existence
of regional business centres that host headquarters whose plants are predominantly in close-by
cities.
Finally, aparticularlyinteresting(butnon-trivial)extensionwouldbetoconsiderheterogeneous
ﬁrms and a small ﬁxed-cost associated with headquarter separation. This would allow for the
co-existence of small ﬁrms, with a tendency to co-locate management and production, and large
ﬁrms, with a greater tendency to separate their headquarters and production plants (Aarland et al.,
2003). Thisextensionwouldalsoallowforaricherurbanlandscapeandforasmootherequilibrium
transition as the costs of managing production remotely decline.
14Dekle and Eaton (1999) and Adserà (2000) ﬁnd evidence that this kind of process is taking place in Japan and the us
respectively.
21Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2






























It follows from (a1) that the elasticity of demand for each business service with respect to a ﬁrm’s
own price is −θ+1
θ , so that the proﬁt-maximising price for each business service is a constant
relative markup over marginal cost:
q0
i = (θ + 1) β0 w0
i . (a2)
Free entry and exit in business services drives maximised proﬁts to zero. From the zero proﬁt






Demand for labour by business service suppliers can be obtained by application of Shephard’s















i α0 θ + 1
θ
, (a4)
where (a3) has been substituted in to yield the ﬁnal expression. By choice of units of business






















Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 7




M ) . (b1)
The developer’s programme of (27), for the case of a city hosting only production plants for multi-













M ¯ e . (b2)
The ﬁrst order condition for (b2) implies that workers consumption expenditure equals the value
of their social marginal product







M ) . (b3)
22Free entry of land developers exhausts their proﬁts in equilibrium. Substituting (b3) into (b2) and
using Πm+h






Turning to a city hosting only headquarters for multi-location ﬁrms, from (12) and (26),
l0
H =












By symmetry, Hh = H for all sectors. Substituting (b5) into (27), the programme for the developer
of a city hosting only headquarters for multi-location ﬁrms is
max
{LH}




(1+ σ)1+σ H[LH(1− τLH)]
1+σ − LH¯ e . (b7)
The ﬁrst order condition for (b7) together with ΠH = 0 yields equilibrium population for any city





Finally, consider a city hosting only integrated ﬁrms. From (4), and Lemmas 2 and 1, the equilib-



























































Zero proﬁts for ﬁnal ﬁrms imply that, if in equilibrium any city has only integrated ﬁrms in sector
h, ch
I = Ph. We can thus use this and (b12) to solve for w0
Il0
I as a function of l0
I, lm+h
I , Ph, and




















ηη(1− η)1−η(1+ θ)ηµ(1− µ)η . (b13)










population in this city. Hence, the developer’s programme of (27) for the case of a city hosting















ηη(1− η)1−η(1+ θ)ηµ(1− µ)η − Lh
I ¯ e , (b14)
subject to
1+ σ






The ﬁrst order conditions for (b14) together with (b14), (b15), and Πh
I = 0 yield equilibrium






and its split between occupations as
l0
I =
η(1+ σ − µ)
1+ γ










LI(1− τLI) . (b19)
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